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debate,	 and	 (being	 neither	 a	 member	 nor	 a	 staff-member	 of	 the	
Commission)	to	set	out	the	questions	I	ask	myself	when	I	wonder	about	
this	subject.	If	that	helps	to	extend	the	debate	over	fraternal	lunches	
and	post-Presbytery	glasses	of	orange	 juice	around	 the	country,	 the	
best	traditions	of	national	Church	debate	will	be	served.2
In	 this	 article	 I	will	use	 ‘Church’	 to	mean	 ‘Church	of	Scotland’	





For the first 350 years after the Reformation, Church and state in 







Church	 and	 state	 both	 declared	 the	 answers	 to	 those	 constitutional	
questions	in	the	Articles	Declaratory	of	our	constitution,	which	were	












It would, I believe, be difficult and artificial to consider Article 
III	and	IV	apart	from	each	other.	The	rights	claimed	under	Article	IV	




responsibilities	 the	Church	 acknowledges	 in	Article	 III	 are	 claimed	
under	 the	 same	 dominical	 institution	 and	 mandate	 by	 which	 the	
Church’s	inherent	authority	is	defended.	Changes	to	the	Third	Article	
might	have	unavoidable	implications	for	the	defence	of	the	Fourth,	to	
which I turn first.









area	 of	 legal	 autonomy	 shrinking	 over	 time,	 and	 see	 the	 advent	 of	
new	regulations	(e.g.	in	child	protection	and	charity	trusteeship)	as	the	
erosion	of	the	Church’s	previous	self-regulation;	while	an	optimistic	
view	would	 see	 the	 ‘new’	 regulations	 as	 addressing	matters	which	
previously	were	not	 regulated	by	either	 the	Church	or	 the	civil	 law	
–	which	 hardly	 constitutes	 an	 erosion	 of	 any	 substantive	 authority.	
The	 pessimistic	 view	 would	 regard	 a	 judicial	 decision	 against	 the	
























For	example,	in	the	Ballantyne v. Presbytery of Wigtown and Others 







the	 right	 to	determine	 legal	 rights	and	obligations,	but	on	 the	other	
hand	 insisting	 on	 designing	 and	 administering	 the	 detailed	 rules	
within	 the	 spiritual	 jurisdiction.	The	 tactic	 has	 had	 varying	 results.	
A	 successful	 example	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 Church	 legislation	 from	








received	 from	 an	 Industrial	 Tribunal	 under	 the	 Sex	Discrimination	
Act.
Is	 this	 ‘equivalence	 of	 protection’	 tactic	 a	 capitulation	 by	 the	
Church	to	the	civil	magistrate?	Is	it	pointless	for	the	Church	to	retain	
a	jurisdiction,	but	consent	to	populate	it	with	laws	mirroring	the	civil	
law?	 Elsewhere8	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 Church	 should	 not	 try	 to	
regulate	anything	which	can	be	adequately	regulated	by	civil	law,	and	
should	not	seek	to	maximise	its	jurisdiction	beyond	what	is	necessary	
to	 obey	 an	 authority	 higher	 than	 the	 civil.	 But	 that	 is	 exactly	why	
the ‘equivalent protection’ manoeuvre is justifiable. The separate, but 
parallel,	regulation	of	the	same	rights	and	responsibilities	is	necessary	
whenever	the	Church	needs	to	retain	the	ability	to	do	things	differently	
from	 the	 secular	world.	 In	many	 areas	 the	Church	may	wish	 to	 go	
further	 than	 the	civil	 law,	perhaps	setting	a	higher	demand	upon	 its	
ministers,	or	providing	a	greater	protection	in	some	area	than	the	civil	
law	affords.	Wherever	 the	Church	wishes	 to	 do	better,	 to	 do	more,	





This	 argument	 only	works,	 though,	 if	 the	 Church	 always	 seeks	





law would now stop us; and I have no difficulty with that.










different	 position	 from	 the	Stuart	Crown.	The	 pre-Disruption	 cases	
unfolded	against	a	background	of	parliamentary	machinations,	with	
legislature	 and	 judiciary	 responding	 quite	 separately	 to	 the	 same	
debate.9	 The	 Percy case	 drew	 in	 arguments	 from	 European	 law,	
which	 long	post-dated	 the	Church	of	Scotland	Act	of	1921	and	put	
into	question	the	extent	of	the	protection	it	offers.	The	civil	magistrate	






settlement.	Today	Parliaments	 in	Europe	and	 in	Edinburgh,	and	 the	
constant	 proliferation	 of	 tribunals	 and	 government	 agencies,	 create	
a	 hugely	 complex	 civil	 law	 framework;	while	 the	 social,	 economic	
and	political	 impacts	of	untamed	globalisation	 reduce	 the	ability	of	
recognised	 authorities	 to	 regulate	 some	 things	 (e.g.	 the	 Internet,	 or	
international	missionary	activity)	very	effectively	at	all.
If	 the	Church	 seems	 to	 be	 unclear	 about	 the	 future	 in	 all	 these	
difficult areas of debate, it is because we are just like Gromit perched 
on a toy train, hurtling across the floor and frantically laying track 
just	in	front	of	us	–	section	by	section	so	fast	you	can’t	see	our	arms	
whirling	 round	 and	 round	 –	 just	 fast	 enough	 that	 the	 train	 has	 line	
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enough	for	its	forward	momentum.	It	may	be	the	glory	of	the	Articles	




The Church of Scotland ministering to society in Scotland today
The	Church	 claims	 its	 legal	 autonomy	–	however	 far	 it	 does	 claim	
it	still	–	to	enable	it	to	minister	to	the	people	of	Scotland	according	
to	 a	 confessional	 basis	 and	 subject	 to	 no	ultimate	 authority	but	 the	
divine.	The	current	debate	about	Article	 III	 asks	what	 the	Church’s	
duty	is,	and	how	it	should	be	territorial	in	its	ministry	and	national	in	
its	character.
Assuming finite resources, and therefore ‘zero-sum’ calculations 













been	 abandoned,	 in	 practice?:	when	 someone’s	minister	 lives	more	
than	50	miles	away?;	when	more	than	three	small	islands	share	one	
minister?;	when	a	UPA	parish	has	more	than	20,000	of	a	non-Catholic	
population?	Questions	about	 the	meaning	of	 the	 territorial	ministry,	
and	the	state	of	it,	have	to	be	taken	together	to	make	sense.
So	 too	 do	 questions	 about	 the	 territorial	ministry	 and	 questions	
about	 the	 ‘national’	 character	 of	 the	 Church	 hang	 together.	 Here	
are	questions	for	a	debate:	does	the	Church	of	Scotland	exercise	its	
territorial	ministry	because	 it	 is	 the	national	Church	with	privileges	
T
page 









What	would	 result	 from	 that	 relinquishing	 of	 ‘national	Church’	
status? Would Scotland flourish better with nothing identified as the 
national	Church?	Would	 some	 of	 the	 expectations	 placed	 upon	 the	






And,	 picking	 up	 the	 earlier	 discussion,	 what	 would	 be	 the	
implication	for	Article	IV	of	this	kind	of	change	in	Article	III?	How	
many	changes	 to	our	model	of	national	mission	does	 it	 take	before	
the	 Church	 of	 Scotland	 is	 not	 discernibly	 different	 from	 other	
denominations	–	or	are	we	indistinguishable	already?	How	long	after	
such	a	 loss	of	distinctiveness	would	our	particular	 form	of	spiritual	
independence	 survive	 –	 or	 does	 recent	 legal	 history	 suggest	 it	 has	
already	 died?	 Which	 way	 do	 the	 dominoes	 lean?	 Can	 a	 national	
and	 territorial	 Church	 (an	 ‘Article	 III	 Church’)	 still	 do	 its	 job	 if	 it	
becomes	more	and	more	an	indistinguishable	subject	of	the	civil	law,	
unable	to	do	things	its	own	way,	to	its	own	standards?	Or	can	a	legally	
autonomous	 Church	 (an	 ‘Article	 IV	 Church’)	 justify	 its	 privileges	














Those	who	 defend	Article	 III	 in	 its	 current	 form	usually	 do	 so,	
I	 think,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 principle.	 Is	 that	what	 it	 is?	Does	 the	Holy	
Spirit	 direct	 the	 Church	 by	 giving	 principles	 to	 follow,	 principles	
which	have	to	be	defended?	That	seems	to	me	just	a	little	too	much	
deus ex machina. God,	dynamic	and	sovereign,	cannot	be	bound	by	
a	principle,	but	gets	done	what	he	wills	to	do.	Article	III,	I	venture	to	
suggest,	is	not	a	matter	of	principle,	but	in	its	day	it	was	God’s	way	





















efficient and effective than this. Or they have to say: there are new 
ways	to	reach	every	place.







White	 of	 the	Barony,	Alexander	Martin	 of	 the	United	Free	Church	
College	(New	College),	and	Lord	Sands	(Christopher	Johnston).	To	
honour	their	achievements,	and	keep	the	forward	momentum	that	is	
the	 calling	of	 a	Reformed	denomination,	 is	 the	 unenviable	 task	 for	
our	generation.	The	conclusions	which	follow	are	simple,	‘no-brainer’	
thoughts,	 designed	 –	 as	 I	 said	 earlier	 –	 to	 generate	 conversations	
around	the	Church.
The	civil	magistrate,	whoever	he	or	 they	may	be	today,	will	not	




There	 are	 many	 positions	 to	 take	 on	 the	 independent	 spiritual	
jurisdiction.	There	is	only	one	test	in	choosing	among	them:	what	do	













2		 Two	 long-familiar	 works	 covering	 some	 of	 this	 material	 are:	
Francis	Lyall,	Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the 
Law of Scotland	(Aberdeen:	Aberdeen	University	Press,	1980)	and	
Douglas	M.	Murray,	Freedom to Reform: The ‘Articles Declaratory’ 
of the Church of Scotland 1921	(The	Chalmers	Lectures	of	1991;	
London: T. & T. Clark, 1993). The considerable legal activity 
in	 this	area	which	post-dates	 those	works	 is	narrated	in	Marjory	
A.	MacLean,	The Crown Rights of the Redeemer: The Spiritual 
Freedom of the Church of Scotland	 (The	Chalmers	 Lectures	 of	
2007;	 Edinburgh:	 Saint	 Andrew	 Press,	 2009).	 An	 interesting,	
lawyerly	discussion	of	 some	aspects	of	 judicial	 freedom	 is	very	
readably	 presented	 in	 Lord	 Rodger	 of	 Earlsferry,	 The Courts, 
the Church and the Constitution: Aspects of the Disruption of 
1843	(The	Jean	Clark	Memorial	Lectures;	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	
University Press, 2008). For readers who would find it helpful to 
have	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	Church’s	 legal	 system,	 see	Marjory	




5		 Percy (AP) (Appellant) v. Church of Scotland Board of National 
Mission (Respondent) (Scotland) [2005] UKHL 73.
6		  Ballantyne and Others v. Presbytery of Wigtown and Others, 1936 
SC	625.
7		 	Acts	IV	and	V	2007.
8		 William	Storrar,	Scottish Identity: A Christian Vision	(Edinburgh:	
Handsel,	1990).
9		 See	Lord	Rodger	of	Earlsferry,	The Courts, the Church and the 
Constitution,	which	narrates	both	these	aspects	of	the	dispute	with	
fascinating	pen-portraits	of	the	main	protagonists.
